2 sacred rituals. In one way or another, the experience of divine presence is not rare, and yet some of us doubt. Particularly if we are intellectuals, we doubt. Why do we do that?
The great Columbia philosopher Frederick J. E. Woodbridge tells of asking his class how you would go about studying frogs. "A naïve student said he would collect a number of frogs,"
Woodbridge writes, but a "clever student" interrupted: How do you know they're frogs? (3) .
Intellectuals want to be clever, and so we ask about any knowledge-claim, how do you know it's knowledge? The motive for being clever is that we don't want to be fools. The effort to avoid being fools virtually defines modern philosophy. Since Descartes, philosophy has been dominated by what one might call the Epistemology of Doubt. Hume sharpened the doubt by arguing that all we can ever really know, or even have a valid idea of, are our own sensory impressions. We don't even have a valid concept of material objects, or of our own minds, or of the past, or future. According to Michael Williams' survey of contemporary epistemology, "[S]ceptical problems are the driving force behind philosophical theories of knowledge. … Such theorizing responds to deep worries about whether knowledge is so much as possible." (4)
Kant reflected this attitude when he declared the "lack of a satisfactory proof" of "the existence of things outside us" to be "the scandal of philosophy." (5) Responding to the challenge have been a variety of rationalisms using a priori reason to override the infirmities of experience; of skepticisms, relativisms, existentialisms, and deconstructions relishing the problem; and of empiricisms, idealisms, pragmatisms, phenomenologies, and critical philosophies offering coping techniques within experience itself. The one position rejected decisively, and often derisively, is what textbooks routinely call "naïve realism."
But there is something to be said for the so-called naïve approach. Woodbridge comments about his two students: "I can see how the naïve student might actually learn something about frogs; I do not see how the clever student ever would." The Epistemology of consciousness is consciousness-of. (12) As Aquinas had put it, one does not perceive the perception; it is by perception that one perceives the object. The senses are the instruments, not the objects, of perception. (13) The Epistemology of Doubt takes consciousness to be self-contained, and so any criteria for reality must be found in the mind itself, either a priori by reason or a posteriori within sensory impressions themselves. The Epistemics of Trust takes our sensory and cognitive powers to be, not only open to, but naturally attuned to, or adapted to, the world and its features.
Put the other way around, the world itself appears to us, presents itself. "Appearance" is not a phenomenon solely on the subjective side. Things are visible, and audible, and touchable. For example, according to Exodus 3, Moses encountered a burning bush and "turned to look." He was not looking for God; he was just tending Jethro's flock. The angel of the Lord appeared to Moses in a humble and improbable place, a bush, but one designed to get Moses' attention, because it was burning but not consumed. Moses turned aside to "look at this great sight" (RSVP), perhaps merely out of curiosity, perhaps recognizing something miraculous, we don't know. What he did not do is ignore the appearance, or rush past too busy to investigate, or dismiss it as sunstroke or the act of an Evil Genius. He paid attention.
Then and only then, "when the Lord saw that he had turned aside to see," did God call to him, "Moses! Moses!" And Moses responded, in the language of a soldier reporting for duty, "Here I am." The voice was apparently authoritative.
The voice introduced itself as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. "And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look at God." He was afraid, but he did not run away.
Even on a cursory reading, we can see that (1) you don't have to be looking for the divine reality to find it, (2) it finds you, (3) it can find you in surprising places, (4) you have to pay attention, (5) you can't let doubt discount the experience, (6) the divine reality is authoritative, (7) it demands a response, (8) you have to yield to it, and (9) you can't give in to your fears.
The burning bush is just one case. An Epistemics of Trust would require a deeper examination of this and other exemplary cases and the further study of each in light of what is learned from the others. But, for me, it is instructive to apply even these preliminary guidelines to my own experience with the divine reality.
Like Moses, I was not looking for the divine reality; it found me. In fact, the experience contradicted -falsified, you might say -the naturalistic philosophy on which I had taken my stand. The place my experience took place was not particularly strange -a park bench facing the Potomac --but there is no reason to think that is a requirement.
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Like Moses, I certainly did pay attention. I suppose I would have had every motive to deflect, to block the challenge to my secular worldview, but I did not. I did not let doubt discount the experience. In fact, I say above that I never had "genuine" doubt. I certainly knew that such experiences can be erroneous or delusional. Whenever I stepped out of the experience and looked at it from a distance, as others would see it, I thought, "I would be a skeptic too."
But, as I say above, the divine presence was too real for genuine doubt. Thomas Reid makes the same comment about perception, memory, and other basic faculties; even Hume admitted that, as soon as he stepped into his garden, his skepticism dissolved. I never let the distant view prevail over the view from within the experience. But I balanced those fears against another one, the fear of failing to answer a divine call.
The choice between Doubt and Trust is not just a philosopher's puzzle. It is, first, a question of cognitive strategy whether doubt or trust will yield the truer worldview. But, deeper than that, it is a question of how one wants to live one's life. All our lives are, as
Gandhi titles his own autobiography, "experiments with truth." We can pursue that experiment in either of two ways. We can shrink from the terror of possible error, the fear of being fools or perhaps of being seen to be fools by our "clever" friends and colleagues;
and hope to live a safe, parsimonious life. Or we can accept the risk, accept our fallibility, accept that as the price of maya or of our fallen condition, or perhaps accept them even as blessings. For there is another risk, which we may count greater, of closing ourselves off from that subliminal presence discerned however faintly. That may be a price too steep. 
